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Golder and Fitzpatrick’s Foucault’s Law is a brief, yet rich, contribution to the 
burgeoning literature on the place of law in Foucault’s thought.  In three densely 
elaborated chapters they defend the view that, far from being the antinomian thinker 
he is often taken to be, Foucault provides the resources for the development of a 
positive conception of law.  
 Golder and Fitzpatrick present their interpretation in dialogue with previous 
writers on Foucault’s analysis of the role of law in the exercise of power.  Chapter 
One (‚Orientations:  Foucault and Law‛) is a critical discussion of the so-called 
‚expulsion thesis,‛ defended most notably by Alan Hunt and Gary Wickham in 
Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (1994).  The expulsion 
thesis finds its textual home in Foucault’s lament that ‚in political thought and 
analysis, we still have not cut off the head of the king.‛1   In Foucault’s view, political 
thought remains tethered to an obsolete model in which power is held by a 
sovereign who exercises it by imposing laws and punishing transgressions of them.2  
It would seem then that part of what is required in order to ‚cut off the head of the 
king‛ is to downplay the significance of law in the analysis of power.  That this is 
part of Foucault’s agenda is suggested by his assertion that ‚we have entered a 
phase of juridical regression in comparison with the pre-seventeenth-century 
societies we are acquainted with.‛3  Thus, an adequate analysis of power must 
eschew a concern with law and turn to more fundamental mechanisms, in particular 
                                                 
1 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction, translated by Robert Hurley 
(New York: Vintage Books, 1978), 88 – 89.   
2 Hobbes’s Leviathan is the paradigm of this type of analysis. Foucault rejects what he calls the 
‚Leviathan Model‛ in Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the College de France 1975 – 1976, edited 
by Mauro Bertanin and Alessandro Fontana; translated by David Macey (New York: Picador, 
2003), 34 – 36.  His remarks there echo those from The History of Sexuality. 
3 Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction, 144.  
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the ‚disciplines.‛4  In short, the expulsion thesis takes Foucault to offer a ‚univocal 
narrative of law’s demise.‛ (22) 
 Golder and Fitzpatrick rightly argue that such a narrative places more on 
Foucault’s injunction to ‚cut off the head of the king‛ than it can bear.  In fact, 
Foucault never denies that law remains important in modernity.  For example, his 
announcement that ‚we have entered a phase of juridical regression‛ is preceded by 
the qualification that 
   
I do not mean to say that the law fades into the background or that the 
institutions of justice tend to disappear, but rather that the law operates more 
and more as a norm, and that the judicial institution is increasingly incorporated 
into a continuum of apparatuses (medical, administrative, and so on) whose 
functions are for the most part regulatory.5 
 
It is clear then that Foucault rejects a particular conception of law – one that fits with 
the Leviathan model described above – but not law per se.  Thus, the question is not 
whether Foucault ‚expels‛ law (plainly he does not) but how he conceives of it, and 
how he theorizes its relationship to power.  Golder and Fitzpatrick address this issue 
by taking up the work of writers who in various ways have contested the expulsion 
thesis. (25–26)  The authors identify three such readings.  The first argues that law 
and discipline, far from being incompatible with one another, are ‚interrelated and 
are deployed jointly in modernity.‛ (26)  The second examines Foucault’s view of 
law in light of his writings on ‚governmentality,‛ which denotes a pattern of 
thought Foucault sees emerging in the sixteenth century.  It is concerned ‚not *with+ 
the maintenance of a transcendent and singular sovereign power over a principality 
but rather the care and maximization of the potential of the population itself.‛ (31)  
According to this second reading, law is an essential instrument of that project.  The 
third reading, defended by Francois Ewald, argues that the expulsion thesis ignores 
the distinction Foucault makes between the ‚legal‛ and the ‚juridical.‛  The ‚juri-
dical‛ is the conception of law appropriate to the Leviathan model; it is a species of 
the genus ‚legal.‛  According to Ewald, Foucault’s analyses trace a transformation in 
law from a set of rules that simply prohibit and punish (i.e., the Leviathan model) to 
                                                 
4 Golder and Fitzpatrick point out that Discipline and Punish is the work ‚most commonly relied 
upon by those who allege Foucault marginalized and expelled law from modernity.‛ (61)  Of 
course, Foucault’s analysis of power is not limited to the disciplines;  governmentality and bio-
power figure prominently as well.  Golder and Fitzpatrick recognize this (see 55) but wisely hold 
the complications it raises at arm’s length (an exception is their brief discussion of the 
relationship between bio-power and governmentality, 32–33).  In what follows I shall use 
‛power‛ as a category term encompassing discipline, governmentality and bio-power, and I shall 
use it or some sub-set of the three crucial Foucaultian terms as the context demands.   
5 The History of Sexuality Volume I: An Introduction, 144.     
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a set of norms that establish standards, averages, etc. that in turn constitute subjects 
and manage populations.6  
 Golder and Fitzpatrick have a decided preference for the first reading.  The basis 
for their preference provides the opportunity for a clarification of the expulsion thesis and 
their reasons for rejecting it.  The second and third readings are alike in attributing to 
Foucault the view that though law does not disappear in modernity, it is subordinated to 
power.  In denying law any autonomy those readings ‚rehearse some of the same critical 
gestures of the ‘expulsion thesis’ and end by confining Foucault’s law and assimilating it 
to the emergent forms of rule in modernity rather than recuperating it.‛ (26)  Indeed, one 
can go further and hold that those readings do not depart from the expulsion thesis in any 
significant way.  For, as Golder and Fitzpatrick acknowledge elsewhere (55), the 
expulsion thesis asserts not that law simply recedes from the scene, but that it is 
subordinated to power in the way the second and third readings contend.7   
So it would seem as if the first reading is the only genuine alternative to the 
expulsion thesis.  Even here though, one may question whether Golder and Fitz-
patrick have succeeded in identifying an alternative to the expulsion thesis.   The 
writers assembled under that banner share the view that law and discipline are 
‚interrelated.‛ (26)  Yet there is no reason to think that this ‚interrelationship‛ – 
which, it should be said, Golder and Fitzpatrick sketch only schematically – is 
incompatible with the crux of the expulsion thesis.   To take one example, it is no 
doubt the case that disciplinary institutions such as the prison, the school, the 
workplace and the hospital depend upon criminal law, property law, contract law 
and so on. (26–27)  However, that is consistent with the claim that the function of 
those bodies of law is best understood as preserving and reproducing a disciplinary 
society (rather than, say, protecting natural rights).  
 The inconclusive character of Golder and Fitzpatrick’s discussion of alterna-
tives to the expulsion thesis – which, at this point, might be more aptly labeled ‛the 
subordination thesis‛ – does not show their rejection of that thesis to be misguided.   
Ultimately, the persuasiveness of their position depends on developing an account 
of law in which it is something other than a mere handmaiden of power.  Golder and 
Fitzpatrick take up that task in Chapters Two (‚Foucault’s Other Law‛) and Three 
(‚Futures of Law‛).  Their approach is innovative in two respects.  The first is their 
attempt to ground law’s autonomy in the incompleteness of power.  The second is 
                                                 
6Francois Ewald, ‚Norms, Disciplines and the Law,‛ in Robert Post (ed.), Law and the Order of 
Culture (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1991), 138 – 141. See 
Golder and Fitzpatrick, 35 – 39.     
7  For example, Hunt and Wickham write, ‚Foucault’s account of the decline of law does not seem 
to involve the thesis that law will wither away. Rather the position can be characterized as 
allocating to law an increasingly subordinate or support role within contemporary disciplinary 
society.‛ Foucault and Law: Towards a Sociology of Law as Governance (London: Pluto Press, 1994), 
56.   
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their use of a number of texts that are generally ignored in this context, namely 
Foucault’s writings from the 60’s on Blanchot and Bataille and from the 80’s on 
ethics and politics.  
Golder and Fitzpatrick locate the incompleteness of power in two sources.   
The first is epistemological.  For example, disciplinary power is inextricably tied to 
the knowledge produced by the human sciences.  Yet, ‚the claim of this knowledge 
in its own terms to ‘scientific’ and ‘true’ status is never convincingly made out.‛  (62)  
Law is thus required to provide the human sciences with the foundation that purely 
epistemological considerations cannot. (67)  Put slightly differently, the human sciences 
are taken seriously not because a due regard for the truth demands it, but because 
the law does.  The second source of power’s incompleteness is the resistance to it.  
‚Simply put *the human sciences+ can identify and stigmatize abnormality but not 
enforce sanctions against it of their own scientific motion.‛ (70)  
 Golder and Fitzpatrick offer a compelling argument that power is incomplete 
in both respects.  Nevertheless, by itself it is inadequate to establish the autonomy of 
law from power.  As it stands, it shows only that power depends on law – but that is 
compatible with the latter being subordinate to the former.  (A general cannot function 
apart from his troops; that does not mean they are not subordinate to him.)    
Interestingly, Golder and Fitzpatrick seem to accept this objection.  Having concluded 
their discussion of the incompleteness of power, they state that their next task is to go 
beyond showing that law ‚remained in place alongside the new powers *Foucault+ 
was describing.‛ (71)  They argue that in addition to the instrumentalized conception 
of law that has appeared in the book to this point, one can discern in Foucault another 
conception of law, a conception that deserves not criticism, but valorization.8   
 Unfortunately, in elaborating this second conception Golder and Fitzpatrick are 
content to rely on words that succeed only in vaguely suggesting something radically 
different from the instrumentalized conception of law.  Their preferred term for 
describing this other conception of law is ‛responsive‛ (see, for example, 72, 73, 77, 78, 
80, 81, 83, 100, 103, 109, 111, 125, 130), supplemented at points by near synonyms such 
as ‛labile‛ (71) and ‛mutable.‛ (77)  However, they provide no detail concerning the 
changes towards which their terminology gestures.  Let me illustrate the difficulties this 
presents by examining one characteristic formulation.  The intent of Chapter Three is to 
show ‚how law through its responsive orientation to the ultimate contingency and 
unpredictability of the future is a constituent component of the social bond in 
modernity.‛ (100)  In the absence of any further specification of the ‚responsiveness‛ of 
law, the formulation suggests nothing so much as H.L.A. Hart’s argument that many 
legal rules and concepts have an ‚open texture‛ (i.e., they lack completely determinate 
criteria of application), a feature Hart finds desirable precisely because it gives law the 
                                                 
8 It should be noted here that Golder and Fitzpatrick think that the two conceptions are 
‚integrally related,‛ 71. Therefore, they are not arguing that the second can or should replace the 
first.   
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flexibility necessary to respond to the contingency and unpredictability of the future.9  
There is no doubt that Golder and Fitzpatrick intend something different than Hart’s 
solid liberalism, but they have not made clear what that is.   
 The difficulties I have just described are mirrored in Golder and Fitzgerald’s 
attempts to ground their positive conception of law in Foucault’s texts.  The tone and 
broad themes of the works on which they rely have an obvious affinity with that 
positive conception.  For example, Foucault’s writings from the 60’s are concerned 
with the possibilities of transgression; his writings from the 80s with the contingency 
and mutability of the self.  What they do not have is any obvious concern with law 
in the sense that is relevant here.  Golder and Fitzpatrick are under no illusions on 
this score, and they readily acknowledge that the ‚responsive‛ conception of law 
they develop is not one that Foucault himself puts forward. (99, 125–126)  This is not 
to say, of course, that the works in question cannot provide the foundation for such a 
conception.  Yet, considerable interpretive work is required to bridge the gap 
between, if I may, their manifest and latent content.  Here again, the necessary 
detailed work is lacking; in its place are extensive quotations, unaccompanied by 
commentary.  While those passages may point toward a ‚responsive‛ conception of 
law, Golder and Fitzpatrick have not shown that they do.  
 These reservations show, I think, that Golder and Fitzpatrick have not made 
the case that the expulsion thesis is inadequate as an interpretation of Foucault.  
Nevertheless, that judgment must be tempered by recognition of the book’s 
considerable merits.  Even if unpersuasive, its main thesis is original and thus well 
worth considering.  In addition, the authors bring to their task an impressive command 
of the primary and secondary literature.  Those looking for an entry point into the 
issue of Foucault and law would do well to begin here.  Last, but by no means least, 
in attempting to extract from Foucault a positive conception of law Golder and 
Fitzpatrick helpfully remind us that he was not simply a theorist of power but an 
activist who issued the admonition, ‚Do not think that one has to be sad in order to 
be militant.‛10  
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9 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, second edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 126 – 
136; cf., Golder and Fitzgerald, 80.   
10 Michel Foucault, ‚Preface to Anti-Oedipus,‛ in Power: The Essential Works of Foucault 1954 – 1984, 
Volume 3, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Helen Lane, Mark Seem and Robert Hurley 
(New York: The New Press, 1997), 109.    
